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Abstract  
A key role in inference is played by randomization, which has been extensively used in clinical 
trials designs. Randomization is primarily intended to prevent the source of bias in treatment 
allocation by producing comparable groups.  
In the frequentist framework of inference, randomization allows also for the use of probability 
theory to express the likelihood of chance as a source for the difference of end outcome. In the 
Bayesian framework, its role is more nuanced. The Bayesian analysis of clinical trials can afford a 
valid rationale for selective controls, pointing out a more limited role for randomization than it is 
generally accorded.  
This paper is aimed to offer a view of randomization from the perspective of both frequentist and 
Bayesian statistics and discussing the role of randomization also in theoretical decision models. 
 
    
 
Keywords. Clinical Trials; Bayesian Inference; Frequentist Inference; Randomization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
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The origin of randomization in experimental design can be dated back to its application in 
psychophysics research in the late nineteenth century. However, systematic studies on the role of 
randomization began with Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1890–1962), who is credited with the 
promulgation of the randomization principle as pointed out by the philosopher Ian Hacking 
(Hacking 1988). In fact randomization was not widely recognized or accepted until Fisher applied it 
to agricultural research starting in the 1920’s (Lee, Chen et al. 2012).  
Much of the theoretical research related to randomization has been conducted in the domain of its 
application to clinical trials. The trial conducted by the (Medical Research Council 1948) to test the 
efficacy of streptomycin for the treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis is generally considered as the 
first application of randomization to clinical trials (Hall 2007).  
Since then, the clinical trial with randomization (i.e. randomized trial) has increasingly gained 
popularity. In the late nineties they became the methodological cornerstone of the evidence-based 
medicine movement (Sackett, Rosenberg et al. 1996) and systematic reviews of randomized trials 
were placed at the apex of the evidence pyramid (Rosner 2012).  
Fisher’s requirement of randomization (1935) initiated a methodological revolution in experimental 
research. In his view randomization accomplished two tasks, one essentially qualitative and the 
other more technical: it eliminated bias and it enabled a valid basis for inference.  
In a clinical trial, properly implemented randomization promotes comparability of treatment groups 
by eliminating the (selection) bias that can be introduced by selecting specific patients to receive a 
specific treatment. Randomization, however, brings a high probability of comparability with respect 
to unknown important covariates as well. Fisher’s second reason for requiring randomization was 
that it provided a firm probability base for statistical inference relying on the randomization itself 
rather than on assumptions concerning the data generating process. Because treatments are assigned 
to patients using random number generators, the rules of probability could be invoked, and the 
likelihood that the result is not due to chance could be evaluated.  
4 
 
The first principle of randomization, “comparing like with like” is largely uncontroversial (Cox 
2009). The possibility of bias in treatment allocation, in implementation, and in assessment of 
outcomes arises in many contexts in which subjectivity is even marginally involved and 
randomization is often the most effective way of avoiding such biases. Failure to randomize 
properly opens the door for confounding to walk in and may fatally compromise a clinical trial. 
The second principle of randomization is a matter of question according to which statistical 
framework is chosen, whether frequentist of Bayesian.  In a nutshell: Bayesian statistics is about 
making probability statements whereas frequentist statistics is about evaluating probability 
statements (Gelman 2008). 
The role for randomization was challenged from a Bayesian point of view by Savage (Savage 1962)  
and several arguments have been put forward to criticize the role of randomization is necessary for 
scientific validity (Urbach 1993; Worrall 2007) 
This paper aims to offer a view of randomization from the perspective of both frequentist and 
Bayesian statistics and discuss adaptive randomization as point of encounter for an ethical 
evaluation of clinical trials. 
 
Randomization and inference 
Frequentist 
The concept of a population model most commonly underlies the development of a statistical test. 
In an experimental setting, this model assumes that the sample of patients is representative of a 
reference population and that the patients’ responses for the outcome variable are independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a distribution dependent on unknown population parameters. In 
the population model, nE and nC patients are randomly drawn from an infinite population of patients 
on treatment E and treatment C, respectively. Then patients’ responses can be regarded as i.i.d. 
according to some probability distribution.  
5 
 
The likelihood function is central to the process of estimating the unknown population parameters 
as it measures the support provided by the data for each possible value of the parameter. 
Under complete or restricted randomization, the treatment assignments are independent of patient 
responses and consequently of the population parameter, say , of interest (this will not be the case 
for response-adaptive randomization presented in the next section). Furthermore, responses depend 
only on the treatment assigned and are i.i.d. under a population model (Lachin 1988). Relying on 
these facts, it can be shown (Rosenberger and Lachin 2016) that the likelihood of the data after n 
patients randomized and evaluated for the outcome, Ln, reduces to  where yi and 
ti are the realized treatment assignments and responses from the i-th patient.  
Note that the likelihood is identical for any arbitrary sequence of treatment assignments, including 
non-random sequences. 
Unfortunately, the assumption that patients are randomly drawn from an infinite population of 
patients on a given set of treatments (say, E and C) is hardly tenable in a clinical trial because 
patients are recruited from various sources by a non-random selection of sites and upon fulfilment 
of inclusion criteria and of requirement of informed consent. Therefore, the lack of a formal 
sampling basis does not justify the application of population models to clinical trials (Berger 2000).  
Another approach to inference is based on the so-called randomization model that considers the 
probabilities of treatment assignment and their dependencies, if any.  
The main difference between the randomization model and the population model lies in how they 
treat the outcome variable of interest and the assignment to treatment: in the former model the 
outcome is fixed and the treatment assignments (design points) are random; in the latter, the 
outcome variable is random at fixed values of the design points (Rosenberger and Lachin 2016). 
Under the randomization model, assumption-free statistical tests for the equality of the treatments 
among the n patients actually enrolled, known as Fisher randomization tests (Fisher 1935), may be 
used. 
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The null hypothesis of a randomization test is that the assignment of treatment E versus C has no 
effect on the responses of the n patients. This probability statement is very different from a null 
hypothesis under a population model, which is typically about the equality of parameters from 
known distributions. Under the null hypothesis of randomization test, a patient’s observed response 
is what would have been observed regardless of whether treatment E or C had been assigned. Then 
the observed difference between the treatment arms depends only on the way in which the n patients 
were randomized. Thus, given a randomization sequence and the associated responses for the 
outcome variable, a randomization test of the treatment effect can be built by permuting the 
sequence in all possible ways according to the randomization mechanism underlying it. 
As stated in (Lachin 1988), statistical inference in a clinical trial must be viewed as a two-step 
process. The first step is to determine whether there is a difference between treatments and the 
randomization test provides an assumption-free test to answer this question. The second step is to 
ascertain the extent to which the observed results can be applied to the hypothetical population from 
which these patients arose. For this, it is necessary to invoke a population model. In this 
perspective, randomization-based inference may be seen as a useful alternative to, or complement 
to, traditional population model-based methods. 
However, it worth mentioning that even if randomization minimizes unmeasured confounding when 
comparing treatment groups this could be not the case when analysing post-randomization factors, 
such as mediation variables. In fact, randomization in principle could not preclude potential 
confounding of the mediation relationships between a non-randomized factor and the outcome 
(Holland 1986).  
 
Bayesian 
In the Bayesian framework, the interest is in the inductive or subjective probabilities, which are 
computed through the Bayes Theorem. 
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For drawing inference, if the assignment mechanism, i.e. the mechanisms used to select 
experimental units and assign treatments, is not ignorable, then it must be modelled itself. The 
explicit inclusion of the assignment mechanism as random variable is pivotal in the Bayesian 
framework (Rubin 1991).  
The distribution  represents the probability of the treatment assignment given the data 
(  and it reflects the mechanisms that select the experimental units to assign to treatments. Thus 
 is the joint probability density function of the observations  given 
 and  is the conditional distribution of  given the choice of the families of the models  and 
.  
For the sake of simplicity, here we consider the recording mechanism, i.e. the missing data-process, 
as ignorable. This is a choice justified by the fact that often unit labels, times of initiation of 
treatments and other aspects thought a priori to be uninteresting are not recorded. Such a priori 
decisions are completely specified, implying that the recording mechanism, i.e. which values are 
recorded for data analysis, is ignorable (Rubin 1978). 
Since the conditional distribution of  given  reflects a state of nature, the model is not 
under the researchers’ control. However, the assignment mechanism in a context of clinical trials 
can be under the researchers’ control, since they can assign treatments to the patients.  
To be ignorable, the assignment mechanism must take the same known value for all the unknown 
 values (Rubin 1978). For example, in a sequential adaptive clinical trial, where the next 
patient receives the treatment based on past data, all values used in making the decision must be 
recorded. Similarly, in a randomized controlled clinical trial the distribution of the matching 
variables (i.e. age, sex etc.) must be recorded. On the contrary if the researchers assign the patients 
to a treatment according to their unrecorded clinical evaluation, or the patients select the treatment 
themselves, the assignment mechanism is not ignorable. Of course, the choice of the recording 
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mechanism can make the assignment mechanism not ignorable, except in the case of a simple 
random sampling followed by a randomized experiment, i.e. when . 
Even if non-ignorable assignment mechanisms can be incorporated into the model leading to valid 
Bayesian inference, they pose greater problems then ignorable ones. In fact, it is common practice 
to choose vague prior distributions to reflect weak prior dependencies between parameters or to 
stretch out informative prior for computational reasons.  
However, in general inference is very sensitive to prior specifications when the assignment 
mechanism is non-ignorable even with no imbalance in the distribution. Let’s consider an example 
for explaining the role that randomization plays in the sensitivity of the posterior distribution. 
Consider two treatments E and C and consider the estimation of an average treatment effect in a 
small sample using a non-informative prior on the distribution of outcomes under each of the two 
treatments. The mechanism of assignment to each treatment has an effect on the variance of the 
posterior distribution. In fact, assigning randomly half of the subjects to each treatment is generally 
better than assigning each subject independently to the treatment, for example by flipping a coin. 
This happens because the expected posterior variance of the parameter of interest is smaller with 
balanced groups, i.e. equal number of subjects in each treatment group.  
For example, compare the following two designs: assignment of the subjects to each treatment E or 
C at random or the systematic design ECECECCECECE. Both designs are ignorable given the 
covariates and thus a Bayesian inference of the outcome given the covariates is valid. However, the 
randomized design is ignorable even not given the covariates. Under the randomized design, the 
Bayesian analysis that pretends covariates are unknown is still valid, yielding a posterior predictive 
distribution . While pretending covariates are now observed, the posterior distribution can be 
updated to produce  Since both analyses are correct given their respective states of 
knowledge, they are expected to be consistent with each other with more precise, i.e. 
smaller variance, than . If this is not, then the modelling assumptions should be reconsidered. 
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This extra step of model examination cannot be carried out under the systematic design without 
explicitly averaging over the distribution of the covariates. Thus, a randomized design increases the 
capability of performing posterior predictive checks (Gelman, Carlin et al. 2014). 
Randomized allocation of patients to treatment has its own advantages, from a statistical point of 
view as well as from a clinical point of view since it allows for matching the trial groups. However, 
in the Bayesian framework the randomization, beyond being not necessary, is not even always the 
best mechanism of allocation of patients in the groups. 
 
Adaptive randomization: point of encounter? 
Clinical trials present a unique situation in which health-related interventions (i.e. drugs, biologics, 
etc.) are being tested for safety and efficacy. Until an intervention is proven to be effective and 
adequately safe, or ineffective or harmful, or just ineffective, the physician is in a state of equipoise: 
a state of genuine uncertainty about which experimental treatment is more effective (Hey and Truog 
2015). In principle, it is ethical to employ randomization in a state of true equipoise. However, 
clinical trials, as experiments on humans, fed a heated debate on the ethics of randomization 
(Saxman 2015). The simplified key question is whether one should use equal randomization ratio 
(say 1:1 in case of two treatment groups) throughout the recruitment. Proponents of the application 
of equal randomization claim that equipoise should be retained until trial completion. Opponents 
advocate to vary the randomization ratio as trial data gets available. In other words, to specify 
randomization probabilities of treatment assignments conditional on the history of previous 
patients’ treatment assignments, responses and/or covariates. 
It is this ethical appeal that has motivated the research and application of adaptive randomization. 
Adaptive randomization alters the probability of patient allocation to different arms in order to meet 
a variety of objectives, while protecting the study from bias and preserving inferential validity of 
the results (Rosenberger 2010).  
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To motivate the use of adaptive randomization techniques in clinical practice, consider a two-arm 
clinical trial comparing an experimental treatment versus control. The most random procedure is the 
completely randomized design for which each subject is randomized between treatment arms with 
0.5 probability and the assignments are mutually independent. This procedure balances treatment 
assignments asymptotically. However, it may likely result in large departures from balance in small 
samples (Cumberland and Royall 1988) and a randomization procedure which corrects such 
deviations is advisable. Furthermore, if accumulating trial data shows one treatment to be more 
promising, a randomization procedure which increases the probability of allocating patients to that 
treatment arm may be used.  
In general, at the study start, all treatment arms have the same allocation ratio. As soon as 
information on outcomes is available, the randomization ratio can change to achieve a variety of 
objectives, including: i) correcting a chance deviation from the intended allocation ratio (i.e., 
restricted or treatment-adaptive randomization); ii) increasing the probability of assignment to the 
more effective or safe treatment (i.e., response-adaptive randomization); iii) balancing covariates 
(risk factors that modify the probability of an outcome) across different treatment arms (i.e., 
covariate-adaptive randomization). Some adaptive randomization procedures combine multiple 
methods such as the covariate-adjusted response-adaptive randomization.  
 
Frequentist 
We refer the reader to the book by (Rosenberger and Lachin 2016) for a technical survey of 
statistical methodologies for adaptive randomization.  
Starting from the pioneering work of Efron’s biased coin design (Efron 1971), restricted 
randomization methods, have been suggested in the literature in order to sequentially force the 
assignment toward balance by taking into account the history of previous allocations. At each step, 
the biased coin designs randomize the assignment by means of the tossing of a biased coin that 
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favours the treatment under-represented. The bias of the coin, p, represents a trade-off between 
balance and predictability.  
(Wei and Durham 1978) were probably the first to discuss response-adaptive randomization. They 
proposed the so-called randomized play-the-winner rule which relies on the urn model and can be 
described as follows: at the outset, the figurative urn contains equal numbers of balls of each colour, 
with each colour associated to a different treatment group. Over time, the urn contains more and 
more balls with colours representing the arms with the more beneficial treatment, resulting in 
allocation of more patients to the most promising treatments. 
This rule was used to design a paediatric trial of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO), 
which compared the ECMO therapy versus the standard therapy (Bartlett, Roloff et al. 1985). 
Unfortunately, the trial provided very little information about survival rates of the two treatments. 
Out of 12 patients, only one was assigned to the standard therapy and died, whereas all 11 infants 
who were randomized to ECMO treatment survived. The main reason for the failure of the ECMO 
trial was the trial’s small sample size and the poor operating characteristics of the play-the-winner 
rule, in particular, the rule’s high variability and dependence on the initial composition of the balls 
in the urn (Rosenberger and Lachin 1993). Unfortunately, to this day, many investigators use the 
ECMO trial example as a reason to not to perform response-adaptive randomization at all.  
The randomized play-the-winner is a heuristic procedure, while others exist based on optimal 
allocation targets. It must be noted that the adaptation of treatment allocation skews the treatment 
assignment and creates a dependency in collected data, thus reducing the statistical power to draw 
conclusions on treatment effect. Therefore, an optimal design of response-adaptive trials should 
consider both statistical power and the proportion of patients assigned to the more promising 
treatment. Several optimality criteria have been proposed to look for optimal allocations for 
response-adaptive designs in the consideration of statistical power. For example, the criterion 
proposed by Rosenberger, Stallard, Ivanova, Harper and Ricks (RSIHR) (2001) is to minimize the 
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expected number of treatment failures while keeping the conditional variance of the Wald test 
statistic at a fixed level.  
The techniques for achieving covariate balance (i.e. covariate-adaptive randomization methods) 
encompass stratified (block) randomization, minimization, and dynamic hierarchical randomization 
(Lin, Zhu et al. 2015). 
 
Bayesian 
The natural capability of the Bayesian designs to deal with accumulated data as the trial progresses 
may be used for enabling dynamic allocation to experimental arms and dropping ineffective arms.  
This flexibility results in a potentially more efficient trial framework by increasing the probability 
of enrolment to arms that show evidence of efficacy. 
Suppose the trial objective is to compare two treatments and patients are enrolled in sequential 
groups. Assume  is the response rate,  is the number of responders, and  is the total number of 
patients for treatment . Based on the standard binomial distribution, the distribution of the number 
of responders follows a Binomial distribution, and a conjugate beta prior distribution 
 is usually chosen. In this scenario, the posterior distribution of  is still a Beta 
distribution  whose parameters are updated to the number 
of responders  and the number of non-responders .  A decision rule can be set to compare 
the response rate between the two treatments. For example, treatment 1 can be declared superior 
than treatment 2 if   
The standard study design randomizes with ratio 1:1 between the two treatments and compare the 
result at the end of study. On the other hand, an adaptive randomized procedure assumes that 
patients are enrolled over time and the interim results to can be used to preferentially allocate more 
patients into the more effective arm with a probability of allocation to treatment 1 given by 
.  
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The case with  corresponds to the scenario of equal randomization, whereas the case with 
 becomes the play-the-winner design (Berry, Bradley et al. 2010). 
The Patient Assisted Intervention for Neuropathy: Comparison of Treatment in Real Life Situations 
(PAIN-CONTRoLS) is an illustrative trial of Bayesian adaptive randomization (Brown, Gajewski et 
al. 2016). PAIN-CONTRoLS trial is aimed at identifying which drug is most effective in reducing 
pain in patients with cryptogenic sensory polyneuropathy (CSPN). Pain at 12 weeks after study 
enrollment is the primary endpoint. Study participants are randomized to one of four drugs and pain 
is measured at 4, 8 and 12 weeks. Each participant at each measurement time is rated as keeping 
taking the drug or quitting due to lack of efficacy or adverse events. 
After an initial phase where 80 participants are randomized with ratio 1:1:1:1 to the four arms (20 
participants for arms), forward patients are allocated to one of the arms according to the posterior 
probabilities obtained from the data collected on the previous participants. 
One way to increase the study efficiency is to incorporate stopping rules. Based on the interim 
result, if there is convincing evidence that one treatment is better than another, there is no need to 
continue the study, allowing better treatments to be adopted earlier. 
In the PAIN-CONTRoLS trial, at each update at the 12-week visit a decision is made on whether 
the best drug is identified according to the rule that the posterior probability of the most effective 
drug is at least 0.925.  Furthermore, any arm with posterior probability of no more than 0.01 is 
designated as loser with no more patients allocated to that arm. On the contrary, under the 
frequentist setting, the sequential stopping and the response-adaptive randomization are typically 
carried out separately because of complications that arise from dependence among the observations, 
which makes it difficult to justify the asymptotic properties of the design.  
By carefully calibrating the design parameters, the loss of the statistical power due to groups 
imbalance can be controlled. At this stage, a key role in the adaptive randomization process is 
played in fact by the prior distribution.  
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A simulation carried out to assess the operating characteristics of the PAIN-CONTRoLS trial 
showed that in the scenario of one best drug, the type I error is approximately 5% and the power is 
about 94% with an average of 266 patients enrolled, below the 400 patients foreseen, half of them 
receiving the best treatment. 
 
Discussion 
Each method of randomization has properties that are better suited to specific applications than 
others. Thus, the choice of a randomization procedure and its implementation depend in part on the 
design features of the study.  
Frequentism fits naturally with the regulatory “gate-keeping” role, through its insistence on 
procedures that perform well in the long run regardless of the true state of nature. And indeed, 
frequentist operating characteristics (Type I error and power) are key elements to regulators. 
Although the Bayesian framework yield only incremental improvements over the frequentist’s 
counterparts, it provides a uniform way of setting up complex problems, parameter estimation, and 
inference making. Bayesian framework also allows more flexible study conduct, such as dropping 
ineffective treatments and adding new treatments, because the inference is based on the data 
(conformed with the likelihood principle) and does not depend on a fixed sampling plan. 
Randomization and balance are conflicting requirements and a suitable trade-off between optimality 
and predictability is crucial, for stopping a clinical trial at any time under an excellent inferential 
setting. In fact, while complete randomization prevents the selection bias of patients, it may led to 
imbalance distribution of some known prognostic covariates across groups.  
On the other hand, treatment assignment based on the knowledge of patients' covariates can 
introduce a bias arising from the predictability of treatment allocation. 
Covariate-adapting allocation procedure are considered an acceptable alternative to random 
assignment for achieving a compromise between balance and selection bias..  
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The Bayesian approach is a natural way to incorporate available data as a prior for decision making 
and therefore is advocated in response-adaptive randomization for clinical trials (Biswas, Liu et al. 
2009). As acknowledged by (Thall and Wathen 2007) there is a large body of literature on adaptive 
randomization methods, both frequentist and Bayesian. Nevertheless, actual application of these 
methods to conduct clinical trials has been quite limited. 
The adaptive randomization addresses the conflict between the common practice of using 
randomization versus the decision theoretic setup that would assign to the patients the optimal 
treatment. Utility based decision theoretic approaches to clinical trials provides a useful framework 
for ethical evaluation of clinical trials. A decision theoretic model is made of the space of all 
potential decisions, a utility (or loss) function and a probability model (Spiegelhalter, Abrams et al. 
2004). 
In this setting, the Bayesian inference provides a natural context to perform a formal decision 
theoretical approach, considering as probability model the posterior predictive model conditional on 
historical data. 
An important aspect of fully decision theoretic approaches is the implication about randomization. 
Is a randomized decision justifiable for maximizing expected utility? As an extreme case, if a 
decision  is equal in term of expected utility to decision  then a random selection among them 
is justifiable, giving room to the frequentist inference, which does not require a model of outcomes 
but it does require a model of assignment (Christen, Muller et al. 2004; Lee et al. 2013). 
However, such justification lacks the main motivations that leads researchers to choose 
randomization, which is to avoid biases arising from confounding and lurking variables. (Berry and 
Kadane 1997) proposed a formal justification of randomization by considering the impact of 
unknown covariates. 
The relative merit of the Bayesian and frequentist approaches continues to be the subject of debate 
in statistics and other scientific fields. Regarding the two paradigms,  we agree with (Lee and Chu 
2012) that Bayesian and frequentist approaches offer complementary views and the future will be 
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cooperative at least on a practical level as recommended by (Little 2006) who suggests, based on  
the strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches, that inferences under a particular model should 
be Bayesian, but model assessment should involve frequentist ideas. 
 
References 
Bartlett RH, Roloff DW, Cornell RG, Andrews AF, Dillon PW and Zwischenberger JB (1985) 
Extracorporeal circulation in neonatal respiratory failure: a prospective randomized study. 
Pediatrics 76(4): 479-487. 
Berger VW (2000) Pros and cons of permutation tests in clinical trials. Stat Med 19(10): 1319-
1328. 
Berry SM, Bradley P, Carlin J, Lee JJ and Muller P (2010 ) Bayesian Adaptive Methods for 
Clinical Trials, Chapman & Hall. 
Berry SM and Kadane JB (1997) Optimal Bayesian Randomization Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society. Series B (Methodological) 59(4): 813-819. 
Biswas S, Liu DD, Lee JJ and Berry DA (2009) Bayesian clinical trials at the University of Texas 
M. D. Anderson Cancer Center. Clin Trials 6(3): 205-216. 
Brown AR, Gajewski BJ, Aaronson LS, et al (2016) A Bayesian comparative effectiveness trial in 
action: developing a platform for multisite study adaptive randomization. Trials 17(1): 428. 
Christen JA, Muller P, Wathen K and Wolf J (2004) Bayesian randomized clinical trials: A 
decision-theoretic sequential design. Canadian Journal of Statistics 32(4): 387-402. 
Cox DR (2009) Randomization in the design of experiments. International Statistical Review 77: 
415-429. 
Cumberland WG and Royall RM (1988) Does simple random sampling provide adequate balance?  
Journal of Royal Statistical Society Series B 50: 118-124. 
Efron B (1971) Forcing a sequential experiment to be balanced. Biometrika 58(3): 403-417. 
Fisher RA (1935) The design of experiments. Oliver and Boyd, Edimburgh. 
Gelman A (2008) Rejoinder. Bayesian Analysis 3(3): 467-478. 
Gelman A, Carlin J, Stern H, Dunson D, Vehtari A and Rubin D (2014) Bayesian Data Analysis, 
Third Edition, Chapman and Hall/CRC, . 
Hacking I (1988) Telepathy: Origins of Randomization in Experimental Design. Isis 79: 427-451. 
Hall NS (2007) R. A. Fisher and his advocacy of randomization. J Hist Biol 40(2): 295-325. 
Hey S P and Truog RD (2015) The Question of Clinical Equipoise and Patients’ Best Interests. 
AMA J Ethics 17(12): 1108-1115. 
Holland PW (1986) Statistics and Causal Inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association 
81(396): 945-960. 
Jiang F, Lee JJ and Muller P (2013) A Bayesian decision-theoretic sequential response-adaptive 
randomization design. Stat Med 32(12): 1975-1994. 
Lachin JM (1988) Statistical properties of randomization in clinical trials. Control Clin Trials 9(4): 
289-311. 
Lee JJ, Chen N and Yin G (2012) Worth adapting? Revisiting the usefulness of outcome-adaptive 
randomization. Clin Cancer Res 18(17): 4498-4507. 
Lee JJ and Chu CT (2012) Bayesian clinical trials in action. Stat Med 31(25): 2955-2972. 
Lin Y, Zhu M and Su Z (2015) The pursuit of balance: An overview of covariate-adaptive 
randomization techniques in clinical trials. Contemp Clin Trials 45(Pt A): 21-25. 
Little RJ (2006) Calibrated Bayes. The American Statistician 60(3): 213-223. 
17 
 
Medical Research Council (1948) STREPTOMYCIN treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis. Br Med 
J 2(4582): 769-782. 
Rosenberger WF (2010) The agile approach to adaptive research. Wiley, New Jersey. 
Rosenberger WF and Lachin JM (1993) The use of response-adaptive designs in clinical trials. 
Control Clin Trials 14(6): 471-484. 
Rosenberger WF and Lachin JM (2016) Randomization in clinical trials: theory and practice. 
Wiley, New Jersey. 
Rosenberger WF, Stallard N, Ivanova A, Harper CN and Ricks ML (2001). Optimal adaptive 
designs for binary response trials. Biometrics 57(3): 909-913. 
Rosner AL (2012). Evidence-based medicine: revisiting the pyramid of priorities. J Bodyw Mov 
Ther 16(1): 42-49. 
Rubin DB (1978) Bayesian Inference for Causal Effects: The Role of Randomization. The Annals 
of Statistics 6(1): 34-58. 
Rubin DB (1991) Practical implications of modes of statistical inference for causal effects and the 
critical role of the assignment mechanism. Biometrics 47(4): 1213-1234. 
Sackett DL, Rosenberg WM, Gray JA, Haynes RB and Richardson WS (1996) Evidence based 
medicine: what it is and what it isn’t. BMJ 312(7023): 71-72. 
Savage LJ (1962) Subjective Probability and Statistical Practice, In: Savage LJ et al (ed) The 
Foundations of Statistical Inference. Methuen, London. 
Saxman SB (2015) Ethical considerations for outcome-adaptive trial designs: a clinical researcher's 
perspective. Bioethics 29(2): 59-65. 
Spiegelhalter D, Abrams K and Myles J (2004) Bayesian Approaches to Clinical Trials and Health 
Care Evaluation. Wiley, Chichester. 
Thall PF and Wathen JK (2007) Practical Bayesian adaptive randomisation in clinical trials. Eur J 
Cancer 43(5): 859-866. 
Urbach P (1993) The value of randomization and control in clinical trials. Stat Med 12(15-16): 
1421-1431; discussion 1433-1441. 
Wei IJ and Durham S (1978) The randomized play-the-winner rule in medical trials. J Am Stat 
Assoc 73: 840–843. 
Worrall J (2007) Why There's No Cause to Randomize. The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 58(3): 451-488. 
 
 
 
